p.171

GENERAL FIELD ORDERS No. 2.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF KANSAS,

In the Field, Fort Larned, July 31, 1864.

I. At all military posts or stations west of the Kansas and Nebraska settlements in this department, stockades or abatis enclosures must be made for the troops and stock, and animals must be kept in such enclosures at night, and never herded during the day without distant and careful pickets, who can give warning of approaching enemies in time to preserve the stock from surprise.

II. Indians and their allies or associates will not be allowed within the forts except blindfolded, and then they must be kept totally ignorant of the character and number of our forces. Neglect of this concealment will be followed by the most severe and summary punishment.

Commanders of forts and stations will furnish escorts according to their best judgments, keeping in view the safety of their own posts, the stage or public property to be guarded, and the preservation of the horses.

These precautions must not be relaxed without permission of the commander of the department, and all officers, of whatever grade, will report promptly to the nearest and most available assistance, and to district and department headquarters, any patent neglect of this order, or any palpable danger to a command.

The industry and skill displayed by Lieutenant Ellsworth, and the troops under his command, in the erection of a blockhouse and other protection for his troops and animals at Smoky Hill crossing, deserve special commendation, while the negligence exhibited elsewhere, especially at this post, while under its former commander, is deprecated and denounced.

By command of Major General S. R. Curtis.

JOHN WILLIAMS,

Assistant Adjutant General.

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On the eve of his attack on the Cheyenne and Arapaho Indians camped at Sand Creek, Colonel John Chivington met substantial resistance from the First Regiment officers and soldiers at Fort Lyon, who vehemently objected to the plan to attack due to the Indians' agreement with Major Wynkoop to surrender and camp as prisoners under the protection of the U.S. military. After a heated exchange between First Regiment officers and officers of Chivington's Third Regiment, Chivington apparently sensed a potential mutiny and quickly asserted his perceived authority* and angrily issued his own version of Field Order No. 2:

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p 165

[General Field Order No. 2.]

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF COLORADO,

Camp in Field, near Fort Lyon, November 28, 1864.

I. Hereafter, no officer will be allowed to leave his command without the consent of the colonel commanding, and no soldier without a written pass from his company commander, approved by the commander of his battalion.

II. No fires will be allowed to burn after dark, unless specially directed from these headquarters.

III. Any person giving the Indians information of the movements of troops will be deemed a spy and shot to death.

By order of J. M. Chivington,

colonel first cavalry of Colorado,

commanding first Indian expedition:

J. S. MAYNARD,

Acting Assistant Adjutant General.

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF THE PLAINS,

Denver, Colorado, April 28, 1865.

Official: GEO. F. PRICE, Acting Assistant Adjutant General.

Military Investigation of the Sand Creek Massacre

Sand Creek Massacre

United States Congress, Senate.

Report of the Secretary of War, Sand Creek Massacre,

Sen. Exec. Doc. No. 26, 39 Cong., 2 sess. Washington, Government Printing Office, 1867

pps 171, 165

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* At the time, the First Regiment officers did not recognize Chivington's authority to order them to attack because the Colonel had ventured outside his jurisdiction. Unbeknownst to anyone, at least there is no evidence to support it, no one other than Chivington himself knew that his enlistment in the army had expired two months earlier, and he technically had no authority to command either the First OR the Third regiments. In retrospect, Sand Creek Massacre researchers now see that Chivington probably knew he might meet resistance should his enlistment expiration be exposed and subsequently allowed for such a contingency by promoting Lieutenant George L. Shoup to Colonel commanding the Third Regiment. The young and inexperienced Lieutenant Shoup, undoubtedly intimidated by the unprecedented promotion, was far less likely than a more seasoned officer to question Chivington, and more apt to defer to his authority.